Are tracking pixels on our website a privacy problem in Australia?
- Published
- Law stated as at
Key points
- The Privacy Act regulates the personal information that tracking pixels collect and pass on to the platform. Guidance from the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (‘OAIC’) makes clear that the Privacy Act does not prohibit the pixels themselves.
- On 24 June 2026, the OAIC announced that the Privacy Commissioner had found that a telehealth provider and a fertility provider interfered with privacy through third-party tracking pixels. Its announcement drew the lesson that a website provider that uses pixels to collect sensitive information, such as health information, must get the visitor’s consent.
- Hashing data does not make it anonymous where a platform can still match it to a person. The OAIC observed hashed details from website forms being shared with platforms and used to match visitors to their profiles, even when they were not logged in.
- Health is one kind of sensitive information, and pages that reveal a visitor’s religious beliefs, sexual orientation, racial or ethnic origin or political opinions raise the same consent rule. For pages that reveal nothing sensitive, a business must still collect only what it reasonably needs, tell visitors about the collection, cover the pixels in its privacy policy and give a simple way to opt out of targeted ads.
A Meta or TikTok pixel is a small piece of code that the platform supplies and a business adds to its web pages. If your website carries one, the pixel can report to the platform what each Australian visitor does. That can include the full web address of each page, the searches typed and the buttons clicked, and in some set-ups a scrambled copy of the name, address or phone number typed into a form.1
In June 2026, the Privacy Commissioner found that two health providers had interfered with their visitors’ privacy through pixels like these. The Commissioner sits within the OAIC. Announcing the findings, the OAIC stated that a website provider using pixels to collect sensitive information, such as health information, must get the visitor’s consent.2
So a pixel can be a privacy problem in Australia. The Privacy Act regulates the personal information that a pixel collects and passes on, and what a business must do depends on what its pages reveal about the person reading them.3 Scrambling the data first, known as hashing, does not take it outside those rules where the platform can still match it to a person.4
When does the Privacy Act reach a website’s pixels?
The Privacy Act reaches a website’s pixels when it binds the business that runs the website and what the pixels send is personal information.
Which businesses must follow the Privacy Act?
The Privacy Act binds businesses in Australia that are not exempt, and also a company from overseas that carries on business here.5 Small businesses are exempt, broadly those with a yearly turnover of $3 million or less. The exemption does not reach a health service provider that holds health information, or a company whose related company runs a business that is not small.6
Nor does the exemption reach a business that passes personal information on in return for a benefit, service or advantage. A disclosure made with the consent of the person it is about, or required or authorised by law, does not count.7 In practice, a small business whose pixels pass visitors’ personal information to a platform in return for advertising services should consider whether that is such a disclosure before relying on the exemption. A separate article explains when an overseas company carries on business in Australia, and which small businesses are exempt.
Is what a pixel sends personal information?
What a pixel sends is often personal information, which is information or an opinion about a person who is identified or reasonably identifiable, whether it is true or not. No name is needed, because other details can identify a person.8
The OAIC explains how the Privacy Act applies to pixels in its 2024 guidance Tracking Pixels and Privacy Obligations.9 It acknowledges that the Privacy Act does not prohibit pixels. It also points out that what a pixel collects may include the address of the page visited, a hashed email address or an IP address, which is the number assigned to an internet connection. It urges organisations to ‘err on the side of caution’ in deciding whether such information is personal information.10
Does hashing the data make it anonymous?
Hashing does not make data anonymous if a platform can turn the details it already holds into code in the same way and match the two codes. Many organisations the OAIC dealt with argued that their browsing data was de-identified, hashed or pseudonymised, that is, labelled with a code in place of a name. But the OAIC observed hashed names, addresses and phone numbers from website forms being shared with social media platforms and used to match people to their profiles, even where they were not logged in.11 Another article, on AI training, explains when de-identified data falls outside the Privacy Act.
What does the Privacy Act require of a website that uses pixels?
Whenever its pixels collect personal information, a business bound by the Privacy Act must comply with the Australian Privacy Principles.12
The rules that matter most for pixels are these.
- The business may collect personal information only if it is reasonably necessary for its functions or activities, and only by lawful and fair means.13
- It may collect sensitive information only with the person’s consent, and only if the information is reasonably necessary, unless an exception applies.14
- It must take reasonable steps to tell visitors about the collection and, among other things, its purposes, who usually receives the information and whether it is likely to go overseas. It must do so before or when it collects the information, or as soon as practicable afterwards if earlier notice is not practicable.15
- Its privacy policy must say what kinds of personal information it collects, how and why, and whether it is likely to send any overseas. It must also say how people can access their information and seek its correction, and how they can complain about a breach of the principles.16
- It may use or disclose personal information only for the purpose it was collected for, unless an exception applies. The exceptions include the person’s consent, and a related purpose that the person would reasonably expect (for sensitive information, a directly related one).17 Using data for a new purpose is covered in the article on AI training.
- Direct marketing, meaning promoting goods or services directly to a person, has its own rules. Sensitive information may be used or disclosed for it only with consent. Other personal information may be used where the person would reasonably expect it, and otherwise only with consent, unless consent is impracticable to get. For that other information, the business must offer a simple way to opt out, and where the person would not reasonably expect the marketing, each marketing message must point out that option. Whatever the information, a person may ask the business to stop marketing to them, and it must do so within a reasonable period, free of charge.18
- Before it discloses personal information to a platform outside Australia, it must take reasonable steps so that the platform does not breach the principles, unless an exception applies.19 A separate article on sending data overseas covers that duty, and when a business answers for what an overseas recipient does.
The OAIC’s guidance also notes that the direct marketing rules apply to targeted online advertising, and that visitors should be able to opt out of targeted ads. It expects the privacy policy to disclose the pixels clearly.20
The pixel is the platform’s code. Why is it our problem?
The pixel is the business’s problem because the business chooses to put it on its pages and controls what it sends. The OAIC’s guidance indicates that the business and the platform will both have privacy obligations. The business deploying a pixel must ensure that it is configured and used in a way that complies with the Privacy Act.21 The guidance also cautions that many pixel providers offer standard terms that cannot be negotiated and that put responsibility for complying with the relevant laws on the business. It advises the business to review those terms before agreeing to them, and to understand how the platform will use and disclose the information it receives before adding a pixel.22
What did the OAIC decide about Medmate and Monash IVF?
The Privacy Commissioner found, in two separate determinations, that Medmate Australia Pty Ltd and Monash IVF Pty Ltd interfered with the privacy of individuals whose sensitive information was collected through third-party tracking pixels. Medmate’s website provides telehealth services, meaning medical consultations by phone or video, and Monash IVF’s website provides fertility services.23
The OAIC announced the findings on 24 June 2026, after investigations that began in December 2024.24 The investigations followed a scan of 50 health service provider websites in October and November 2024, and a closer inspection of 12 websites. Of the 50, 52% used a third-party tracking pixel, and 77% of the sites using one did not mention it in their privacy policy.25
The OAIC summarises the Commissioner’s decision as establishing that using pixels to track visitors to a health-related website, and then targeting them with advertising on social media, is a collection of sensitive information. It follows that the website provider must get the visitor’s consent.26
Two points in the OAIC’s account of the decision matter beyond health. First, the OAIC treats the business that runs the website as collecting the information, even though the pixel sends it straight to the platform.27 The platform may collect it too: the OAIC’s guidelines on collection recognise that two entities can collect the same personal information.28 Second, the Commissioner looks at what a page view reveals or lets a platform infer, writing that every page view on a health site ‘potentially reveals or infers health information about an individual’.29
What follows a determination?
Each determination requires the provider not to repeat or continue the conduct that breached the Privacy Act, and to take specified steps to address it, as the OAIC’s list of determinations records.30 If a provider does not comply with the determination, the Commissioner can ask the Federal Court or the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia to enforce it. The court then decides afresh whether the provider breached the Privacy Act.31
We are not a health business. Does the decision reach us?
The decision concerned two health providers, but its reasoning can reach a business outside health. It turned on sensitive information, of which health information is only one kind.32 In announcing it, the Commissioner said that website providers must get consent where they use pixels to collect sensitive information, ‘such as data on health, political opinions, race or ethnicity’.33 So the consent rule explained above can apply to a page whose address, search box or form reveals a sensitive matter about a visitor, or lets a platform infer one.34
Depending on what the pixels send, pages of that kind can include those of a dating site for gay men or a shop for religious goods. An inference about a visitor can be sensitive information even if it is wrong, because, in the OAIC’s guidance, inferences about people are personal information whether or not they are accurate. The OAIC’s guidance gives a further example: a flight booking in which a pixel collects a request for help with a hearing impairment, which could be health information. It advises that organisations should generally seek express opt-in consent, meaning that the visitor actively says yes, if a pixel is likely to collect sensitive information and pass it to a platform.35
What can follow a breach of the pixel rules?
A breach of any rule mentioned above is an interference with privacy, which the OAIC can investigate, as it did with Medmate and Monash IVF.36 A privacy policy that leaves out required content, or direct marketing without a simple way to opt out, can also attract an infringement notice, which names a fixed sum for the business to pay.37
For a serious interference with privacy by a company, the maximum civil penalty is at least $50 million.38 A court deciding whether an interference is serious may consider the sensitivity of the information, how many people were affected and whether the conduct was repeated.39 In practice, a pixel on a sensitive page can involve all three: sensitive information, many visitors and conduct repeated with every visit.
A visitor may also be able to sue the business for a serious invasion of privacy, which can include misusing information about the visitor. That right has its own requirements, including that the business acted intentionally or recklessly.40
Worked example: does a Guangzhou skincare brand need consent for its pixels?
The skincare brand in this example is hypothetical.
Take a Guangzhou skincare brand that sells to Australians from its own website, with Meta and TikTok pixels on every page. A visit to its moisturiser page reveals only that someone looked at a moisturiser. Its ‘eczema check’ quiz is different: the pixels send the platforms each visitor’s answers and the address of a results page ending ‘/severe-eczema’. For the example, the brand carries on business in Australia, its turnover exceeds $3 million, and it sends the data to platforms that can match it to the visitors.
First, the Privacy Act binds the brand, because it carries on business in Australia and is not a small business.41
Second, the quiz data is personal information, because the platforms can match it to the visitors, whether or not it is hashed.42 It is also information about each visitor’s health, so it is health information, a kind of sensitive information.43
Third, the brand needs the visitor’s consent before the pixels send any data from the quiz pages.44 Going by the OAIC’s announcement of the June 2026 findings, the brand collects that data, even though its pixels send it straight to the platforms, which may collect it too.45 Data from the moisturiser page needs no consent, because the page reveals nothing sensitive. Even so, the brand may collect only what it reasonably needs, and its privacy policy and collection notice must cover the pixels.46
Fourth, suppose that the brand later shows ads for its eczema cream to people who took the quiz. That is a use of health information for direct marketing, which needs each visitor’s consent to that use, not only to the collection.47 If the platforms are outside Australia, the brand must also take reasonable steps before disclosing the data to them.48
Finally, if the brand collected quiz data without consent, the OAIC could investigate and, as it did for Monash IVF, require the brand to stop and to take specified steps.49 The Commissioner could also ask a court to order the brand to pay a civil penalty.50
Which steps should a business with pixels take now?
A business with pixels on a website that Australians visit, skincare brand or not, should work through seven steps.
- List every pixel and what it sends, and review the pixels regularly to make sure each is set up properly and that using it is still reasonable and necessary. The OAIC’s guidance stresses that this checking should not be ‘set and forget’.51 Before adding a pixel, review the platform’s terms and how it will use the data, as explained above.52
- Switch pixels off on pages that reveal sensitive information, or get express opt-in consent before the pixels send any data from those pages, as explained above.53 A banner that only tells visitors about the pixels does not give that consent.54
- Set each pixel to collect and share the minimum, and check any setting that sends what visitors type into forms, even in hashed form.55
- Update the privacy policy and the collection notice so that they describe the pixels and contain the matters explained above.56
- Offer a simple way to opt out of targeted advertising.57
- If a platform receiving the data is outside Australia, take the reasonable steps explained above before the data goes.58
- If a pixel has already sent sensitive information without consent, switch it off on the pages concerned. Then consider whether the disclosure is an eligible data breach. That term covers an unauthorised disclosure of personal information the business holds, where a reasonable person would conclude that serious harm to any visitor is likely.59 The OAIC’s guide on data breaches counts a disclosure as unauthorised if the Privacy Act does not permit it, even if the business meant to make it.60 If the business has reasonable grounds to suspect such a breach, it must assess promptly whether there has been one, taking all reasonable steps to finish within 30 days. If it has reasonable grounds to believe there has been one, it must tell the Commissioner and the visitors affected as soon as practicable.61 How the data breach rules work is explained in the article on overseas companies.
Questions
- Is Meta or TikTok responsible for the pixel, rather than the website?
- The platform and the business that runs the website can both be responsible. The OAIC’s guidance is that each has privacy obligations, and that the business deploying the pixel must make sure it is configured and used in line with the Privacy Act.
- Is hashed data still personal information?
- Hashed data can still be personal information. The OAIC saw platforms use hashed names, addresses and phone numbers from website forms to match people to their profiles, so hashing did not stop the data identifying them.
- We sell clothes, not health services. Do we need consent for our pixels?
- A clothing retailer does not need consent to collect pixel data from pages that reveal nothing sensitive. It still needs a privacy policy and collection notice that cover the pixels, and collection limited to what is reasonably necessary. Targeting ads with the data is broadly allowed where visitors would reasonably expect it or have consented, and they must have a simple way to opt out.
This article is general information about Australian law as at the date shown above. It is not legal advice and does not take account of your circumstances. Reading it does not create a lawyer–client relationship with SQ Legal. Obtain advice on your own matter before acting. See the terms of use.
Related
- Does the Australian Privacy Act apply to a company based outside Australia?
- Can we send Australian customers’ personal information to our head office overseas?
- Can we use Australian customers’ data to train an AI model?
More on data and privacy, or contact SQ Legal about a matter.
Anna Zheng, ‘Are tracking pixels on our website a privacy problem in Australia?’, SQ Legal (Web Page, 16 November 2026) <https://sqlegal.com.au/insights/tracking-pixels-privacy-act/>.
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Footnotes
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Carly Kind, ‘Your Life, Pixelated: How Tracking Pixels Watch Your Every Click’, Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (Blog Post, 24 June 2026) <https://www.oaic.gov.au/news/blog/your-life,-pixelated-how-tracking-pixels-watch-your-every-click>. ↩
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Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Privacy Commissioner Finds Privacy Breaches in Third-Party Tracking Pixel Investigation’ (Media Release, 24 June 2026) <https://www.oaic.gov.au/news/media-centre/privacy-commissioner-finds-privacy-breaches-in-third-party-tracking-pixel-investigation> (‘Tracking Pixel Investigation’). ↩
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Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6(1) (definition of ‘personal information’), sch 1 (‘Privacy Act’). ↩
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Kind (n 1). ↩
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Privacy Act (n 3) ss 5B(1A), (3), 6C(1) (definition of ‘organisation’). ↩
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Ibid s 6D(1), (4)(b), (9). ↩
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Ibid s 6D(4)(c), (7). ↩
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Ibid s 6(1) (definition of ‘personal information’). ↩
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Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Tracking Pixels and Privacy Obligations (Guidance, 4 November 2024) <https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-guidance-for-organisations-and-government-agencies/organisations/tracking-pixels-and-privacy-obligations> (‘Tracking Pixels Guidance’). ↩
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Ibid. ↩
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Kind (n 1). ↩
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Privacy Act (n 3) ss 14–15, sch 1. ↩
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Ibid sch 1 cls 3.2, 3.5. ↩
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Ibid sch 1 cls 3.3–3.4. ↩
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Ibid sch 1 cls 5.1–5.2. ↩
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Ibid sch 1 cl 1.4. ↩
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Ibid sch 1 cls 6.1, 6.2(a). ↩
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Ibid sch 1 cls 6.7(a), 7.1–7.4, 7.6–7.7. ↩
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Ibid sch 1 cls 8.1–8.2. ↩
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Tracking Pixels Guidance (n 9). ↩
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Ibid. ↩
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Ibid. ↩
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‘Tracking Pixel Investigation’ (n 2). ↩
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Ibid; Kind (n 1). ↩
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Kind (n 1). ↩
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‘Tracking Pixel Investigation’ (n 2). ↩
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Ibid. ↩
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Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Chapter 3: APP 3 Collection of Solicited Personal Information’ in Australian Privacy Principles Guidelines (Guidelines, 13 May 2026) [3.10]–[3.11] (‘APP 3 Guidelines’). ↩
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Kind (n 1). ↩
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‘Privacy Determinations’, Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (Web Page) <https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-assessments-and-decisions/privacy-decisions/privacy-determinations>; Privacy Act (n 3) ss 13(1)(a), 40(2), 52(1A)(a)–(b). ↩
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Privacy Act (n 3) s 55A(1)(b), (2), (5). ↩
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Ibid s 6(1) (definition of ‘sensitive information’). ↩
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‘Tracking Pixel Investigation’ (n 2). ↩
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Privacy Act (n 3) sch 1 cl 3.3; Kind (n 1); Tracking Pixels Guidance (n 9). ↩
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Tracking Pixels Guidance (n 9). ↩
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Privacy Act (n 3) ss 13(1)(a), 40(2). ↩
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Ibid ss 13K(1)(b)(ii), (v), 80UB(1)(a). ↩
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Ibid ss 13G(1), (3), 80U(1)–(3). ↩
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Ibid s 13G(1B)(b), (d), (f). ↩
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Ibid sch 2 cl 7(1). ↩
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Ibid ss 5B(1A), (3), 6C(1), 6D(1). ↩
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Ibid s 6(1) (definition of ‘personal information’); Kind (n 1). ↩
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Privacy Act (n 3) ss 6(1) (definition of ‘sensitive information’), 6FA(a)(i). ↩
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Ibid sch 1 cl 3.3. ↩
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‘Tracking Pixel Investigation’ (n 2); APP 3 Guidelines (n 28) [3.10]. ↩
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Privacy Act (n 3) sch 1 cls 1.4, 3.2, 5.1–5.2. ↩
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Ibid sch 1 cl 7.4. ↩
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Ibid sch 1 cl 8.1. ↩
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Ibid ss 40(2), 52(1A)(a)–(b); ‘Privacy Determinations’ (n 30). ↩
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Privacy Act (n 3) ss 13G(1), (3), 13H(1), 13J, 80U(1)–(3). ↩
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Tracking Pixels Guidance (n 9). ↩
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Ibid. ↩
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Ibid. ↩
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APP 3 Guidelines (n 28) [3.34]. ↩
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Tracking Pixels Guidance (n 9); Kind (n 1). ↩
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Privacy Act (n 3) sch 1 cls 1.4, 5.1–5.2; Tracking Pixels Guidance (n 9). ↩
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Privacy Act (n 3) sch 1 cls 7.2(c), 7.3(c); Tracking Pixels Guidance (n 9). ↩
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Privacy Act (n 3) sch 1 cl 8.1. ↩
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Ibid s 26WE(1)(a), (2). ↩
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Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Part 4: Notifiable Data Breach (NDB) Scheme’ in Data Breach Preparation and Response (Guide, February 2025) <https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/notifiable-data-breaches/preventing-preparing-for-and-responding-to-data-breaches/data-breach-preparation-and-response/part-4-notifiable-data-breach-ndb-scheme>. ↩
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Privacy Act (n 3) ss 26WH, 26WK–26WL. ↩
Sources
- Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)
- Carly Kind, ‘Your Life, Pixelated: How Tracking Pixels Watch Your Every Click’, Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (Blog Post, 24 June 2026)
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Privacy Commissioner Finds Privacy Breaches in Third-Party Tracking Pixel Investigation’ (Media Release, 24 June 2026)
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Tracking Pixels and Privacy Obligations (Guidance, 4 November 2024)
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Chapter 3: APP 3 Collection of Solicited Personal Information’ in Australian Privacy Principles Guidelines (Guidelines, 13 May 2026)
- ‘Privacy Determinations’, Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (Web Page)
- Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Part 4: Notifiable Data Breach (NDB) Scheme’ in Data Breach Preparation and Response (Guide, February 2025)